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Abstract 
This paper offers an understanding of the lifeworld of a person with Parkinson’s Disease 
derived from Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). A key feature of IPA is its 
commitment to an idiographic approach which recognises the value of understanding a 
situated experience from the perspective of a particular person or persons. The paper has two 
main aims: firstly, to demonstrate how a focus on individual experience chimes with and can 
inform current ideas of a more personalised humanized form of healthcare for people living 
with Parkinson’s disease; and secondly, to demonstrate how an IPA study can illuminate 
particularity whilst being able to make, albeit cautiously, more general knowledge claims 
which can inform wider caring practices. It achieves these aims through the detailed 
description and interpretation of one person’s experience of living with Parkinson’s disease 
and it applies a lifeworld lens to point to how the various constituents of the lifeworld, such 
as embodiment, selfhood, temporality and relationality enable the IPA researcher to make 
well-judged inferences which can have value beyond the individual case.   
 




We set the scene for our interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) by situating it within 
contemporary demands for people- or patient-centred approaches within health and social 
care (Epstein, Fiscella, Lesser & Stange, 2010; Williams & Grant, 1998)  which have 
humanizing values at their core. Humanization invokes a form of care which is rooted “in an 
ontology of human beings as relational, experiential, valuable, respect-worthy, meaning-
oriented, flawed, imperfect, vulnerable, fragile, complex, and capable of health and healing 
even if not capable of being cured.” (Willis, Grace & Roy, 2008: 34). This ontology reflects 
the principles that inform IPA practice and points to how a humanizing framework and IPA 
research might be used to guide and inform each other in mutually beneficial ways. 
Moreover, it has particular pertinence for people living with chronic neurodegenerative 
conditions such as Parkinson’s disease which has a life expectancy only slightly below that of 
the general population. Thus the demands of the disease can be lived with for many years. 
 
Humanizing value frameworks mesh with current thinking and policies on how forms of care 
should be people-centred. What people-centred care might look like in practice includes the 
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expert patient model which promotes self-management to social ecological systems which 
emphasize the person-in-context and as part of a collaborative team with health and social 
care providers (Greenhalgh, 2009). It is the latter systemic approaches which chime most  
strongly with IPA’s view of the person and its idiographic stance to which we now turn. 
 
Being idiographic 
Phenomenological research such as IPA means taking a first-person perspective seriously 
because it recognizes that our experiences have a quality of for-me-ness. When a person bites 
into a ripe peach and tastes its sweetness they know it is themselves and not someone else 
who is having this experience and that for someone else, eating the peach will be given 
differently. We have “direct acquaintance” with our experiences, albeit not infallible (Zahavi, 
2008) and IPA believes that understanding this first-person givenness  means doing so from 
the perspective of the person for whom the experience is given. 
 
For IPA, idiography is the necessary and inevitable starting point for research because “all 
human knowledge is inevitably idiographic – all that is is experienced once” (Salvatore & 
Valsiner, 2010: 3 original emphasis) and it forms the ground for generalization. It is through 
an understanding of how this event is experienced by this person at this particular time that 
we can make generalizing moves. IPA aims to understand how a particular lived situation is 
experienced by a particular person at a particular time whilst recognizing that this experience 
is indivisibly woven into the person’s lifeworld. By lifeworld we mean the world that we 
experience, that is replete with meaning for us and in which people, events and so on matter 
to us. IPA research which reflects on individual’s lifeworlds, attempting to grasp what it is 
that matters can make a valuable contribution to developing forms of people-centered care. 
(See Blinded, 2017a and 2017b, for further development of IPA and idiography). 
 
Moving beyond the idiographic to the general 
Heidegger draws attention to how our worlds are both distinctive yet shared: 
 
The surrounding world is different in a certain way for each of us, and 
notwithstanding that we move in a common world. (Heidegger, 1982: 164) 
 
Each of us inhabits a subjective situated world which shares “ever-present characteristics” 
(Ashworth, 2006: 215) with the situated worlds of others. These characteristics are universal 
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features of the lifeworld and include the many projects we commit to and care for, our 
embodied, temporal and relational natures, and how we are always attuned to the world in 
specific ways.  
 
This means that although the singular experienced situation is the starting point for IPA, (say, 
a  person living with chronic pancreatitis) typically, this is followed by an examination of 
several experiences to see what they share and what they might tell us about the make-up of 
the experience more generally (such as how life limiting changes such as diet have an impact 
upon family and social relationships) before ending with a more philosophical or theoretical 
reflection which might ask what these experiences say about the nature of human being (we 
are relational beings) and for the possibilities of change to exist (Halling, 2008). This move 
from the particular to the general is a cautious and considered undertaking and at all times, 
IPA seeks to retain the rich and personal detail of the particular whilst pointing to ways in 
which the particular illuminates (and is illuminated by) characteristics of the lifeworld which 
are common to us all. These lifeworld features provide a useful lens through which to 
examine the concrete particulars of an individual situation and say something about its more 
universal features.  
 
Epistemological stance and methodological process  
In this section, rather than discussing the principles of IPA and how they are typically 
employed (although see First author for a general account of how-to-do IPA and Authors for 
a specific example) we have chosen to give a flavour of our methodological stance and 
process. The principles and steps of IPA are well documented and accessible; what is 
sometimes missing is how they are put into action and realized in the research. 
 
Using IPA involves approaching the research process with a purposeful phenomenological 
and hermeneutic orientation; this involves thinking, making decisions and executing them in 
a way that fits with such a stance. IPA’s central concern is with lived experience which we 
understand as a form of “concernful involvement” (Yancher, 2015:109) by people for whom 
the world and the events, objects and people within it matter to them and show up as things to 
be reflected on and made sense of. Here, it is Barbara’s (pseudonym) experience of living 
with Parkinson’s disease that we are interested in.  
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One way we aimed to be phenomenological towards Barbara’s lived experience was to think 
carefully about the language we used to think about various aspects of the research process. 
For example, rather than ‘interviewing’ our participant, we saw it as a conversation between 
two people both bringing something to the encounter but with different roles: Barbara as the 
experiential authority on the situation to be talked about and one of us (First author) as 
enabling Barbara to describe her experience and focus on what was important to her. We 
deliberately cultivated a sense of language as practical engagement both in the conversation 
and throughout our collaborative process of understanding Barbara’s experience of living 
with Parkinson’s disease.  
 
Rather than thinking we were doing ‘data analysis’ in some formal sense, we reminded 
ourselves of  how the prescribed steps in IPA are asking us to reflect on what people tell us 
through a turning away from facts to meanings; from what Barbara is living through to how 
she is living through it.  We maintained this focus by asking ourselves how it came to be this 
‘what’ for Barbara, out of all the possible ‘whats’? (Churchill, 2012). For example, how she 
described feeling frustrated when someone else might have described feeling resentful. From 
Barbara’s descriptions, we reflected on how she experienced this frustration by attending to 
all the other things she told us about – her past history, her present and future concerns, her 
relationships and so on. 
 
The key guiding tenet that underpins the process described above is the view that IPA 
researchers are existential world-disclosers (Yancher, 2015) who hold the view that when we 
examine and scrutinize lived situations and experiences, phenomena are disclosed (or 
concealed) through language which has the “power to make things manifest.” (Taylor, 
1985:238).  
 
More formally, we worked through the IPA stages, at first working independently having 
agreed that we would each spend time immersing ourselves in Barbara’s story. We each 
made detailed notes and comments aiming to capture what mattered to Barbara as well as 
documenting our early sense-making. At this stage, we aimed to be open to many possible 
meanings, keeping our themes provisional and emergent. This was followed by discussions 
where we reflected on these meanings moving between them and the transcript itself to 
ensure that we did not lose sight of Barbara and her lifeworld. These collaborative reflections 
and the formal analysis led to a structure comprised of three experiential themes : “I was 
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beginning to lose my grip”, “It’s like having an evil twin” and “Trying to drag me along like 
a tortoise.” Using a lifeworld lens, these themes speak to embodiment, selfhood, relationality 
and temporality. These lifeworld aspects do not exist discretely; rather they connect strongly 
with each other so that we can speak of an embodied temporality, a relational temporality and 
an embodied self which we hope to demonstrate in the next section. Figure 1 presents this 
thematic structure. 
 
Our interpretative-phenomenological narrative 
At the time of the interview, Barbara was 61 years old and had been living with a diagnosis 
of Parkinson’s disease for four years. Barbara’s personal and unique stance towards having 
Parkinson’s disease and which we elaborate on with the second theme, is that Parkinson’s 
disease is a worthy adversary. She is both realistic about what is to come in terms of the 
limitations the disease will impose on her but she is determined to meet them head on and 
develop strategies to cope with them. For example, she has bought a child’s toothbrush 
because “it’s fatter to hold, it’s an electric one so that makes it easier to clean. I’m trying to 
think ahead whenever I meet a problem, how am I going to deal with a problem, how am I 
going to sort it out before it actually gives me grief.” It is these sorts of actions that help 
Barbara regain some sense of the unthinking practical engagement of daily life.  
 
Included in this narrative are some brief reflections drawn from another case study conducted 
by the first author (Blinded, 2018). They are included to illustrate some of the ways in which 
IPA might move from the particular towards the general both empirically (the slow accruing 
of individual cases) and theoretically (through the application of relevant lifeworld 
characteristics).  
 
“I was beginning to lose my grip” 
Barbara uses the word “grip” multiple times to convey how, in a very tangible sense, she 
experiences her body as recalcitrant; she has difficulty signing the consent form saying “The 
hands aren’t very good today, unfortunately the grip’s not there today” She describes how 
this weakening grip made her feel when she was still working: 
 
I was getting slower and slower with my hands and I realized I wasn’t packing 
properly I couldn’t grip things properly and carry a tray properly, I felt vulnerable. 
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Parkinson’s disease limits Barbara’s ability to carry out everyday taken-for-granted activities, 
literally loosening her grip on them. Prior to diagnosis, she felt that she was not only losing 
her physical grip on things but also psychologically because she did not understand what was 
happening to her although she “knew there was something wrong”: 
 
I was glad to have a name on [sic] it. I thought I was going nuts, I really did think I 
was beginning to lose my grip because I was crying. Well, I wasn’t crying, I would 
get up in the morning and go make a cup of tea and my eyes would start to cry. I 
didn’t feel unhappy, sad or upset in any way but my face would cry…I’d just be 
standing there having a cup of tea and start to cry and I thought this is mad, I’m losing 
my grip.  
 
Barbara’s crying is probably an ocular abnormality and a non-motor symptom of the 
Parkinson’s; what is of interest here is Barbara’s palpable sense that she was going mad; not 
only losing her physical grip but her grip on reality which disappeared on diagnosis: 
 
 I: So, you said it was almost a relief? 
B: Oh yes, to know there was something wrong with me, that I wasn’t going loopy, 
you know that I was losing my grip.  
 
The different ways that ‘grip’ is used conveys both (a) a strong sense of how Barbara’s 
embodied unreflective ‘ready-to-hand’ relationship with significant objects that matter in a 
practical sense is disrupted and (b) how not knowing what is wrong is an unnerving 
experience which shakes one’s reality. A diagnosis of Parkinson’s allows Barbara to find a 
place for the disease in her life. 
 
Barbara no longer has a harmonious relationship with her body; rather daily tasks assume a 
disproportionate significance: 
 
Trying to get washed in the morning it’s a Herculean task, trying to get washed, trying 
to brush my teeth…you’re trying to have a wash and what you do you smack 
yourself, I can’t actually do it…it’s very very hard…it’s a bit hit and miss. 
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Elsewhere, as previously mentioned, one of us has drawn attention to how Parkinson’s  
renders one’s body conspicuous. Like Barbara, (Blinded) experienced her body as 
meddlesome and unable to enjoy the unreflective movement of the ‘absent’ body we take for 
granted when we are well (Leder, 1990). Svenaeus’s idea of “unhomelikeness” was drawn on 
to highlight how the disease altered (Blinded’s) embodied self so that her world felt 
unfamiliar because she had lost her sense of unreflective engagement with daily tasks. This 
thinking can be extended to Barbara.  We suggest that, for both women, these experiences 
emphasize the need for a caring-for-living approach and not just a caring-for-disease one. For 
example, helping people with Parkinson’s disease to develop ways in which, at least part of 
the time, they can experience their bodies as familiar and unobtrusive. 
 
“It’s like having an evil twin” 
As previously mentioned, there are many ways a person with Parkinson’s disease might come 
to terms with its presence in their lives and develop strategies to cope with it. Barbara treats 
Parkinson’s as an opponent to battle with: 
 
I seem to be battling all the time, battling with Parkinson’s, fighting it, fighting it all 
the time… I’ve always met things head on, I’d rather know and deal with it, that kind 
of thing, [I] don’t sweep things under the carpet I’ll face it and sort it no matter how 
horrible it is. 
 
Here, Barbara gives us an insight into her way of perceiving and living in the world: adversity 
is to be faced and challenges met. This coping style is not for everyone and is a reminder that 
one of the challenges for person-centred care is how to develop personalised forms of care 
which make use of personal knowledge, personal history and past personal experience and 
value their contribution. At several points throughout the interview Barbara described how 
she has always been ‘the Boss” and how she does not “like to feel useless because I’ve 
always been very capable.” Understanding the importance of this sense of self for Barbara 
should be relevant for how she is cared for – not only by healthcare professionals but by 
family and friends also. Her particular approach needs to be acknowledged for how it might 
help (and hinder) how she lives with the demands of Parkinson’s. 
 
Barbara invokes an intriguing metaphor to describe her relationship with the disease: 
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It’s like having an evil twin. I go to bed at night and I think tomorrow morning, I’m 
going to get up and I’m going to hoover the floor and I’m going to do some washing. 
I get up in the morning and I go and get the hoover out and I can’t do it. I just stand 
there, I know what to do, I know exactly how to hoover but my hands won’t do 
it…it’s things like that, I feel like I’ve got this evil twin that won’t let me do what I 
want to do, it stops me when it finds out what I’m trying to do. 
 
Likening Parkinson’s to having an evil twin suggests an intimate relationship exists between 
Barbara and the disease; one that is both Barbara and not-Barbara. This evil twin or alter-ego 
stands in opposition to Barbara in a relationship of radical alterity because of the complex 
relationship between her changing unruly body and how these changes affect and erode her 
sense of self as capable, responsive and “a strong character.” We wonder if this vivid 
metaphor serves an explicit purpose for Barbara in that it acts as a spur for her to be 
resourceful in the face of Parkinson’s: to acknowledge the limitations it brings, yet at the 
same time to envisage new possibilities of being. Thus the evil twin might be a motivating 
force for Barbara, an interpretation which appears to resonate with Barbara’s personal take on 
the disease as a worthy adversary. 
 
Barbara believes it is her responsibility to be proactive saying, “that it is my responsibility to 
do the best for me that I can.” To this end, she does things which help to alleviate this sense 
of an evil twin as part of her embodied self. She has found that both music and dance can 
give her a sense of release from her restrictive and over-thinking body so that she regains a 
sense of what Sartre called the body as “passed-over-in-silence” (Sartre, 1956) and her 
Parkinson’s fades out of awareness.  For example, at times when Barbara loses control of her 
movement especially when walking on the flat, she sings a Bee Gees song out loud which 
works even if only for a short time: 
 
I tend to trip on my toes so I have to think in my head, you’ve seen how I walk, I’m 
quite shaky, a bit unsteady but if I start singing Night Fever in my head then I can 
walk fine. It’s really crazy, you’ve seen how stiff and awkward I am and I can’t get 
my balance and stuff. I just think in my head Night Fever you know, it’s amazing and 
then I stop, I’m back to where I was I can only keep up for a little while, it’s crazy.  
 
 9 
Similarly, Barbara describes attending a dance class organized by her Parkinson’s support 
group: 
 
He [the instructor] got people up to dance who were very stiff and awkward and that 
was very good. I’d love to see something over here [where she lives], part of the 
physio help, a dance class for Parkinson’s to go to because it makes you feel the relief 
when it happens, the relief it’s not in your head, it’s the restrictions are lifted from 
your body, you can do it in the way you used to do it. 
 
In these circumstances, Barbara’s body is present as her body, rather than the alien body of 
the evil twin she perceives it to be when Parkinsonian symptoms dominate. 
 
“Trying to drag me along like a tortoise.” 
This theme exemplifies our earlier claim of how it is possible to speak of deep 
interconnections between the various lifeworld characteristics, in this case temporality and 
relationality. Lived time is a consequence of the relationship between the embodied subject 
described above and the world; it is a “situational sensing of experienced time” (Wyllie, 
2005:174). For instance, a tedious and long car journey seems “to last for ever” in contrast to 
a snatched romantic lunch which “flies by.” This sense of experienced time is captured in 
Barbara’s description of herself as a tortoise which conjures up a sense not only of her 
movement as slow and laborious but also her body as cumbersome. 
 
Time is foregrounded in how Barbara has to structure it in the face of her Parkinson’s. She is 
slow when she first gets up and as the morning progresses, she improves but by the late 
afternoon she describes herself as “wearing down again”. Consequently, she needs a routine 
which enables her to get things done when she can; spontaneity is a thing of the past and she 
has no choice but to allow time for activities that were once completed without a thought: 
 
It takes me quite a while in the morning, it takes me quite a while to get dressed. I 
can’t move because I am very stiff and it does take me 10 minutes to get dressed, or if 
I do it in stages, it can take half an hour. 
 
Barbara’s descriptions illuminate the complex connectivity between a self which is always 
embodied, temporal and relational. Several times she contrasts a former self who ‘was always 
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dashing here and there all the time” with the person who now finds that activities such as 
going to the shops takes “longer and longer.’ Not only is this slowing down frustrating for 
Barbara, she is acutely aware of its effect on other people: 
 
The frustration is bad enough for me, it must be horrendous for Peter (her son) 
because he’s much quicker and on the ball than I ever was and he has to kind of drag 
me along, trying to drag me along like a tortoise is a bit galling.  
 
We suggest that there are at least two meanings for Barbara’s use of the word drag. First, 
Barbara experiences her slow body as something to be dragged along making mundane tasks 
arduous and time-consuming. Second, she is a drag in that she feels like a drag for her family 
and friends and this interpretation receives support when she talks of how she limits going 
out with friends: 
 
I was always out with my friends, you know all those kinds of things, visiting garden 
shows, garden centres…and all those things have been very much curtailed because 
I’ll slow them down and although they’re quite happy for me to go with them, I know 
that I’m going to be a drag on them. 
 
There is a strong sense that being a drag means being a burden and Barbara makes this 
connection explicitly when talking of how she has started to defer responsibility to her 
children: 
I think there comes a time when you need to do that anyway, you need to let the 
children, well they’re not children anymore, you need to step back, it’s their turn to 
take on some of their responsibilities and that kind of thing so I don’t feel bad about 
it, I just hope that I’m not becoming a burden, you know I’m not becoming somebody 
who’s becoming a drag. 
 
Similarly, (Blinded) described feeling a burden on her family and friends. Etymologically, a 
burden is a weight or duty to be borne and speaks to how living with Parkinson’s can distort 
one’s roles and relationships giving rise to feelings of a one-sided dependency and a desire to 
avoid or withdraw from people leading to social isolation. For both women, these relational 
vulnerabilities need to be recognised by those caring for them and support given to help them 




The idiographic work presented here chimes with a growing demand for caring practices 
which are tailored to the needs of the individual person. What these needs might be come to 
light through qualitative approaches such as IPA. This might mean, for example, recognizing 
that although people with Parkinson’s want treatment which diminish or even remove their 
motor symptoms, they also want practical support to help them with the often arduous task of 
daily living. For these concerns to be heard and valued means that a more reciprocal and 
human relationship between the individual person and those that care for them is required. 
People are always more than their symptoms, their disease and “the quality of the journey is 
just as important as the destination” (Todres, Galvin & Holloway, 2009: 75). When the 
lifeworlds of people like Barbara are diminished and their well-being possibilities reduced, 
then the challenge becomes how we can ensure a form of care that enables them to flourish 
and maintain a sense of existential legitimacy (Craig, 2013).  
 
Humanizing care involves moving beyond expert patient programmes (Fox, Ward & 
O’Rourke, 2005; Franek, 2013) which emphasize patient self-management and “buddy” 
support systems (Epping-Jordan, Pruitt, Bengoa & Wagner, 2004) - as important as these 
might be for a more multifaceted form of care  - and towards humanizing forms of care which 
bring “our ways of knowing into closer harmony with our ways of being in the world.” 
(Buttimer, 1976: 278). Barbara utilizes her personal life skills and is resourceful in order to 
enhance her own self-care and giving her a sense of control and purpose. The conflict with 
her evil twin which she uses as a spur exemplifies this. This store of personal knowledge is 
invaluable and central to a truly tailored and person-centred care; a reciprocal relationship 
between those providing care and those receiving it which emphasizes not what has been lost 
for the person but what they have got and can become. 
 
Living longer lives with chronic conditions such as Parkinson’s disease puts increasing strain 
on health and social care systems worldwide and some might say that a humanizing care 
framework based on utilizing reciprocal knowledge is impossible. However, we agree with 
Todres and colleagues that this is a luxury that we can and must afford. 
 
Summary of key points 
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IPA research can be part of the endeavour to transform healthcare culture into a humanizing 
practice which emphasizes peoples’ lifeworlds and the power of interpretative understanding. 
 
Collaborative approaches which utilize reciprocal knowledge and decision making may 
require the dropping of ‘a professional front’ acknowledging a tension between the voice of 
medicine and health sciences and that of the lifeworld (Barry, Stevenson, Britten, Barber & 
Bradley 2001). However, achieving a deeper understanding and appreciation of peoples’ 
unique personal knowledge, skills and experience may be valuable in achieving mutually 
agreed healthcare practices with better adherence and outcomes. 
 
Nurses are trained to listen and communicate with empathy; complex skills which can be lost 
in a pressurised task-oriented environment with little time or energy for emotional 
investment. A recognition of the importance of these skills not only serves to strengthen the 
relationship between practitioners and those involved in their care, but can enhance job 
satisfaction for health professionals. 
 
Ethical approval was given by the first author’s institution. 
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